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Abstract
This paper describes the security weakness of a recently proposed secure commu-
nication method based on parameter modulation of a chaotic system and adaptive
observer-based synchronization scheme. We show that the security is compromised
even without precise knowledge of the chaotic system used.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been
proposed [1], many of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness
and security. In [2], the author proposes a symmetric secure communication
system based on parameter modulation of a chaotic oscillator acting as a
transmitter. The receiver is a chaotic system synchronized by means of an
adaptive observer.
In this paper we show how to break the proposed cryptosystem when Lorenz’s
attractor is used as the non-linear time-varying system ([2, §3.2]), which, in
fact, was the only example explained in detail. Lorenz system is described by
the following equations:
x˙1 = −σ1x1 + σ2x2, (1)
x˙2 = rx1 − x2 − x1x3, (2)
x˙3 = x1x2 − bx3. (3)
In the example the system is implemented with the following parameter val-
ues, (σ1, σ2, r, b) = (10, 10, 28, 8/3). The signal used for synchronization of the
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receiver is x1. The encryption process is defined by modulating the parameter
σ1 with the binary encoded plaintext, so that it is σ1 +2.5 if the plaintext bit
is ”1” and σ1−2.5 if the plaintext bit is ”0”. The duration of the plaintext bits
must be much larger than the convergence time of the adaption law. Actually,
in the example the bit rate is 0.2 bits/second. The uncertain system can be
rewritten in a compact form as:


x˙1
x˙2
x˙3


=


−σ1 σ2 0
r −1 0
0 0 −b




x1
x2
x3


+


0
−x1x3
x1x2


+


1
0
0


(−y)θ (4)
y = C · x = x1 (5)
C = [1 0 0] (6)
θ = ∆σ1 = ±2.5 (7)
The decryption process consists of a chaotic system synchronized by means of
an adaptive observer. The observer-based response system is designed as:


˙ˆx1
˙ˆx2
˙ˆx3


=


−σ1 σ2 0
r −1 0
0 0 −b




xˆ1
xˆ2
xˆ3


+


0
−xˆ1xˆ3
xˆ1xˆ2


+ LC(x1 − xˆ1) (8)
L = [0 38 0]T (9)
The plaintext can be retrieved from the first derivative of the receiver uncer-
tainty defined as:
˙ˆ
θ = −5y(x1 − xˆ1) (10)
The initial conditions of the transmitter and receiver are: (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) =
(10, 15, 20) and (xˆ1(0), xˆ2(0), xˆ3(0), θˆ(0)) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
Although the author seemed to base the security of its cryptosystem on the
chaotic behavior of the output of the Lorenz non-linear system, no analysis of
security was included. It was not considered whether there should be a key in
the proposed system, what it should consist of, what the available key space
would be, and how it would be managed. We discuss the weaknesses of this
secure communication system in Sec. 2 and in Sec. 3.
2
2 Power analysis attack
The main problem with this cryptosystem lies on the fact that the ciphertext
is an analog signal, whose waveform depends on the system parameter values
and therefore on the plaintext signal, which modulates one parameter. Con-
sequently, the plaintext signal may be recovered from the transmitted signal
power. Fig. 1 shows the Lorenz chaotic attractor for the different values of
the parameter σ1 proposed by the author, making apparent the strong depen-
dence of waveforms from the plaintext. In Fig. 1 (a) and (b) the attractor
corresponding to σ1 = 7.5 and to σ1 = 12.5 are shown, respectively. We can
observe that the signal amplitudes are quite different. In Fig. 1(c) the attractor
trajectory corresponding to a modulation of the σ1 parameter between 7.5 and
12.5 is shown. We can observe that the resulting trajectory is the superposi-
tion of the two preceding trajectories, although both are clearly recognizable,
allowing the easy separation of each other.
To break the system we have implemented the chaotic transmitter of the
author’s example with the same parameters values and initial conditions. The
simulation is identical to the one employed in the original example, a four
order Runge-Kutta integration algorithm in MATLAB 6. A step size of 0.001
was used.
To recover the plaintext we used no chaotic receiver, instead we computed
the short time power analysis of the ciphertext. The procedure is illustrated
in Fig. 2. The first step consists of squaring the ciphertext signal, x1. Next,
this signal is low-pas filtered and, finally, binary quantized. The low-pass filter
employed is a four pole Butterworth with a frequency cutoff of 0.5 Hz. The
quantizer is an inverting Smith-trigger with switch on point at 80 and switch
off point at 50.
The result is a good estimation of the plaintext, with tiny inaccuracies con-
sisting of small delays in some transitions. Note that the short initial error
was also present at the beginning of the retrieved signal obtained with the
authorized receiver described in the author’s example.
It should be emphasized that our analysis is a blind detection, made without
the least knowledge of what kind of non-linear time-varying system was used
for encryption, nor its parameters values, and neither its keys, if any.
3
3 Generalized Synchronization attack
A more precise signal retrieving of the plaintext can be performed if we know
what kind of non-linear time-varying system was used for encryption, but still
without the knowledge of its parameter and initial condition values.
We have implemented another attack by means of an intruder receiver based
on generalized synchronization [3], fairly simpler than the authorized receiver.
We use the following receiver:


˙ˆx1
˙ˆx2
˙ˆx3


=


−σ1 σ2 0
0 −1 0
0 0 −b




xˆ1
xˆ2
xˆ3


+


0
rx1 − x1xˆ3
x1xˆ2


(11)
The plaintext recovery procedure consists of the estimation of the short time
cross correlation between the ciphertext and the recovery error. It is illustrated
in Fig. 3. The first step consists of calculating the synchronization error of the
receiver ∆x1 = x1 − xˆ1. Next the synchronization error ∆x1 is multiplied
by the ciphertext x1. Then this signal is low-pass filtered. Finally, a binary
quantizer is used to regenerate the plaintext. The low-pass filter employed is a
four pole Butterworth with a frequency cutoff of 0.5 Hz. The binary quantizer
is a Smith-trigger with switch on point at 11 and switch off point at 9.
We have found that the sensitivity to the parameter values is so low that the
original plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext using a receiver system
with parameter values considerably different from the ones used by the sender.
The parameter values can be obtained with a very accurate precision by means
of the trial and error procedure varying them in an effort to approximate the
filter output signal to a square wave. However, their exact knowledge is not
necessary to recover the plaintext, as already illustrated in Fig. 3.
The approximate range of parameter values that causes a chaotic behavior of
the Lorenz oscillator is:
σ1 = {4, 14}, (12)
σ2 = {8, 30}, (13)
r = {24, 90}, (14)
b = {1.5, 4.5}. (15)
Actually, we have selected for our implementation, represented in Fig. 3, the
central value of each of the preceding parameter ranges, that is: (σ1, σ2, r, b) =
(9, 19, 66, 3), with initial conditions (xˆ1(0), xˆ2(0), xˆ3(0), θˆ(0)) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
4
4 Conclusions
The proposed cryptosystem is rather weak, since it can be broken without
knowing its parameter values and even without knowing the transmitter pre-
cise structure. There is no mention about what the key is, nor which is the key
space, a fundamental aspect in every secure communication system. The total
lack of security discourages the use of this algorithm for secure applications.
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Figure captions
Fig. 1. Lorenz attractor with different parameter values: (a) σ1 = 7.5; (b) σ1 = 12.5,
(c) σ1 is switched between 7.5 and 12.5 by the plaintext.
Fig. 2. Power signal attack: (a) plaintext; (b) ciphertext, x1; (c) squared ciphertext
signal, x2
1
; (d) low pass filtered squared ciphertext signal; (e) recovered plaintext.
Fig. 3. Generalized Synchronization attack: (a) plaintext; (b) ciphertext, x1; (c)
signal generated by the intruder’s receiver, xˆ1; (d) synchronization error of the
intruder’s receiver, ∆x1 = x1 − xˆ1; (e) ciphertext multiplied by synchronization
error, x1 ·∆x1; (f) low-pass filtering of (e); (g) recovered plaintext.
